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Abstract
The objective of this master's thesis is to study the long-term relationship between the interper-
sonal and functional distribution of income and GDP growth in Portugal for the period between
1985 and 2016.The econometric model chosen is the ARDL-bounds test.There is evidence that the
transfer of income from the capital to the labor factor has positive eects on the long term growth
of Portugal. The increase in top yields (TOP 0,01%) also have positive but smaller eects.As the
reasons given for the increase in the weight of prot share are essentially the same as the increase in
top income, it is concluded that governments should be focused on measures to increase wage share
and consequently reduce income inequality, having positive long-term economic growth eects.
Keywords :ARDL, bounds-test, Wage Share, Functional Distribution of Income, Top Incomes, Post-
Keynesian Economics.
JelCodes :E11, E12, E22, E24, E25.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1970s, Portugal's average growth rate continued to slow down. At the same time,
the functional distribution of income has been unbalanced in favor of capital income and top income
has gained preponderance. In order to increase inequality, it was crucial the adoption of pro-capital
economic policies. Since 1960, real wage growth has been lower than the growth in labor productivity.
The policies prescribed by most economists to contain unit labor costs (ULC) are aimed the reduction
of the Wage Share (WS). This tendency of the decrease in the WS was veried in most of the countries
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
So, in the year 2016, the wage share reached its lowest value since 1960. According to Krueger
(1999), in the last decades, the increase in the weight of white-collar workers has contributed to the
fact that WS has become the wrong way of measuring labor input on a country's level of income.
According to Guilera (2008) and Alvaredo (2009), since the mid-1980s, top yields had a generalized
increase in Portugal. If we join these facts, we conclude that, if we exclude the weight of top incomes,
the reduction of the WS was even stronger (OECD, 2012).
For the most popular models of current macroeconomics, the distribution of income has no impact
on economic growth, because it is assumed that markets are fully competitive, and the return of inputs
coincides with their marginal productivity. Thus, policies favoring technical progress and structural
reforms designed to make prices and wages more exible will cause an increase in potential growth of
the economy and increasing job creation.
By contrast, the Post-Keynesians (PK) do not agree that structural reform, i.e. pro-capital reforms,
stimulates the growth of economies because they argue that wages are a source of additional demand
for the economy and that marginal costs of rms are constant, which leads to a decrease in average costs
until the level of total productive capacity (Lavoie, 2009). The main limiting factor for the investment
is the lack of aggregate demand (AD), and this does not depend on saving's level. Investment decisions
will inuence economic growth and the functional distribution of income.
For PK economists, as the marginal propensity to save in terms of prots, and for higher-income
worker is higher, so the transfer of income from the capital factor to labor factor, or from a rich
individual to a poor individual, would contribute to an increase in AD.
Following the explanation of PK theories, we will study the long-run relationship between the
functional/interpersonal distribution of income and the economic growth rate, using the ARDL-bounds
test model. This methodology has the advantage of not requiring that the various variables of the
model have the same level of integration. The use of this methodology is unusual for analyzing the
relationship between economic growth and inequality, and in the case of Portugal, it is the rst time
it is being used. The period of analysis of the ARDL model is between 1985 and 2016.
The purpose of my research is to understand the impact of variations in inequality on Portugal's
economic growth. If it is concluded that the eect is negative, then the adoption of pro-capital measures
will not be reasonable in terms of social justice or from the economic point of view. If it is found that
the eect is positive, then even if there is an increase in income inequality, it is assumed that the
general population will benet from increased welfare.
The thesis has the following organization: in section 1, is reviewed the main literature on these
topics; in Section 2, will be made a descriptive analysis of the evolution of economic growth and
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inequality, and possible determinants of the latter will be discussed ; in section 3, will be examined
the economic mechanisms by which the functional and interpersonal distribution of income can aect
economic growth; section 4 will be focused on the econometric model, and nally, there will be a
discussion of the results.
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2 Literature review
There is a vast literature on the impacts of variations in the functional and interpersonal distribution
of income on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth.
The rst models that tried to compare these phenomena were due to Rowthorn (1981), Blecker
(1989), and later Bhaduri & Marglin (1990).
According to Rowthorn (1981), an increase in the WS was always expansionary, because it would
lead to an increase in AD, ie wage led growth. Bhaduri & Marglin (1990) have pointed out that
sometimes the WS increase was not expansionary, and that savings could sometimes have the eect in
a prot led scheme.
In general, the models about functional distribution of income are considered exogenous in a single
equation model, separating the eects of variations of WS on private consumption, private investment
and net exports (NX).
Oliveira (2013), elaborated an empirical study for the Portuguese economy. The ndings were
similar: an increase of 1 p.p. in the WS, would accelerate GDP growth by about 0,11%. Higher
economic growth would occur by the dierence between the marginal propensities to consume between
wages and prots (0,76 and 0,27), despite the negative eects on private investment and NX. It should
be noted that the development of private investment is heavily inuenced by GDP growth (very strong
accelerating eect). In Stockhammer & Onaran (2016), the conclusions were similar. An increase of 1
p.p in WS causes an acceleration of Portuguese GDP by 0,34%.
Onaran & Obst (2016), developed a study where they analyzed the economic regime of the countries
of the European Union (EU) 15 . Most of the economies were in wage led regime. In the case of
Portugal, an increase of 1 p.p in Prot Share (PS) will lead to the deceleration of GDP by 0,14 p.p.
The transfer of income from the labor factor to the capital factor would contribute to the decrease
in consumption and private investment, and an increase in NX. The increase in PS in the EU15 as
a whole would have even stronger results.The main conclusion of this study is that a coordination
between European States to raise WS would be benecial for all countries.
The attempt to endogenize the WS variable would make the interpretation of the data more com-
plicated and it would not be possible to measure the quantitative impact of changes in WS on each
individual macroeconomic variable. The use of a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model makes it possible
to analyze reciprocal eects between WS variations and economic growth. This system is however lim-
ited, since the number of endogenous variables that can be used is reduced. Stockhammer & Onaran
(2004) used this technique to analyze the Turkish and South Korean economies.
The various studies point out that the main economies are in a wage led regime.
Economists say that economies should not promote the increase in WS because it will contribute
to the increase in ULC. However, sometimes, this is not necessarily negative. According to Kaldor
(1978), in the post-World War II period, the countries with the highest growth rates of the ULC were
also those with higher GDP growth (Kaldor's paradox).
By contrast, there are empirical studies indicating that wage increases have positive eects on
labor productivity developments 1.The Kaldor-Verdoon condition also occurs in the most dierent
1Vergeer & Kleinknecht (2010) studied this relationship for 19 OECD countries (1984-2004) and concluded that
increasing real wages by 1pp leads to increases in labor productivity between 0.31-0.39p.p.
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economies2.
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2010), the reduction of WS, contributed
to a reduced level of AD, which led to accumulation of external imbalances between countries. The
increase in income inequalities would cause the onset of the 2008 Financial Crisis because it contributed
to the economic agents' indebtedness and the widening of macroeconomic imbalances (Ranciere et al,
2012 ; Kumhof et al, 2013; Treeck, 2014).
For Palley (2011), economic growth through increased debt (Eg-United States of America, Spain,
Italy, Greece, etc.) or through export promotion (eg - Germany, Japan, China) are interdependent
(exporting countries provided nancing to countries with credit booms , but the latter consumed the
goods produced by the former). In the long term these growth strategies are unsustainable due to the
excess of the indebtedness of the rst groups of countries and due to the increase in the relative weight of
the second group of countries.Thus, Palley concludes that systems are "depleted" and therefore should
increase economic cooperation between countries to try to increase the WS, especially by exporting
countries.
Carvalho & Rezai (2015) studied the dierence between the marginal propensity to consume for
workers with dierent levels of income and concluded that the marginal propensity to consume de-
creases as the level of income increases3.In the same study, they demonstrated that the reduction of
interpersonal inequalities contributed to the economic regime to become more wage -led4.
Palley (2013a) developed an innovative model, where he tries to divide the economic agents into
capitalists, workers and managers. This distinction happens to analyze, on the one hand, the economic
impact of the increase of WS (transfer of income from capitalists to both managers and workers) and,
on the other hand, the economic impact of wage transfers from workers to managers. This study was
an innovation because it assumes that an economy can be in dierent regimes (prot or wage led)
depending on whether we are analyzing the functional or interpersonal distribution of income 5.
The conclusion of this section is that several research studies have already addressed the relationship
between the interpersonal/functional distribution of income and economic growth. However, this
research is one of the rst to create a system with interpersonal and functional income distribution at
the same time. As a rule, inequality tends to penalize economic growth.
3 Descriptive Analysis
In this chapter will be analyzed the interpersonal income inequality and the WS in Portugal. It
will also address some determinants of interpersonal inequality and WS.
The Portuguese economic growth has experienced dierent phases since the early 1960s, homewer
the tendency has been the decrease in the rate of economic growth - see gure 1.
2According to McCombie et al (2002), in the OECD countries, GDP growth by 1pp is associated with productivity
growth of 0.46p.p.
3Carroll (1998) and Palley (2010), carried out an empirical analysis and reached the same conclusions.
4In an economy with a low level of interpersonal inequality, the dierential between the marginal propensities to
consume between wages and prots is higher than in a country with a high level of interpersonal inequality.
5It is important to study the simultaneous eects because from the 1980s to the great recession the WS was a slight
decrease, but the increase in interpersonal inequalities was very strong.
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Figure 1: Economic Growth in Portugal (1960-2016)
Source = AMECO
3.1 Evolution of Functional Distribution of Income
The functional distribution of income relates to how the income is distributed by the dierent
factors of production. A major remuneration of the labor factor is wages (Wn)6. Thus, capital is
remunerated by what is designated as the gross operating surplus, ie,dividends, interest and prots
(πn).
When we calculate GDP at factor prices, we exclude Indirect Tax Net of Subsidies (ITS).
GDPMarketPrices = Wn + πn+ ITS (1)
Thus, the formula is:
GDP = PGDPn = Wn + πn = wnL+ rnK (2)
The real product (GDP) is calculated by dividing the nominal product (GDPn) by the price index
(P). The total wage (Wn) can be calculated by multiplying the nominal average wage (wn) by the
employment (L).Total prots (πn) are calculated by multiplying the nominal prot rate (rn) by the
level of the capital stock (K ).
The functional distribution of income was very important to classical economists. For Ricardo
(1911), nding out which fundamental laws determined this form of income distribution is one of the
main problems of political economy.
In 1957, the economist Nicholas Kaldor indicated a set of facts that would become controversial.
One of the most important facts was that WS, ie the proportion of income distributed in the form of
labour compensation, was constant over time (Kaldor, 1957). When this premise was indicated, most
economies grew at a strong pace, unemployment was residual and people reap the fruits of economic
growth through better wages and more social benets, and therefore, it did not attract much interest.
6Other examples of remuneration in the labor sector are performance bonuses, regular bonuses and remuneration for
supplementary work.
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However, in the mid-2000s, a set of studies indicated that the WS had been steadily declining since
the 1970s, and this phenomenon was happening on a global scale (Karabarbounis & Neiman , 2013).
For Atkinson (2009), it was important to study the functional distribution of income because it
would help to explain interpersonal inequality, to discuss the fairness of dierent forms of income, and
because it is useful for understanding the link between incomes at the macroeconomic level (national
accounts) and incomes at the individual or household level.
The ILO has identied that the average WS has fallen by about 10 p.p from the 1970s to the
pre-crisis period (Stockhammer, 2013). At the same time, according to Daudey & Garcia-Penalosa
(2007), the decrease in WS has had repercussions in increasing interpersonal inequality, because as the
capital income is more unequal, an increase in this share will penalize the distribution of interpersonal
income.
There has been a large increase in income inequality, especially with regard to the top incomes 7
And at the same time, workers with a median and low income saw their wages stagnate. The proportion
of workers considered to be underpaid 8 , increased by two-thirds in the 37 countries surveyed since
the mid-1990s (ILO, 2010).
In the post-crisis period, WS continued its downward trend, especially in the European countries
most aected by the crisis of 2008 (ILO, 2016) - see table 10 in the Appendix.
The institutions FRED and OECD produce estimates of WS. Two series regarding data, WS at
market prices and factor prices (minus taxes on production and imports, plus subsidies) have been
published. According to Guerriero (2012), it makes more sense to use GDP at factor prices because
taxes are not considered return on capital and therefore should be subtracted, since subsidies are
retained and must be added.
The following formula determines an economy's WS











Deriving the previous formula, it becomes a relation between real wages and labor productivity,
that is, Real ULC. Thus, for the value of WS as a percentage of GDP to remain constant, it is necessary
that real wages increase at the level of labor productivity, assuming other constant assumptions.
The economic policies of the European Commission (EC) aimed at containing ULC ultimately lead
to a reduction of WS (Felipe, 2011).
According to Naastepad & Storm (2006), growth in labor productivity and real wages was high
in the OECD countries during the period 1960-19809. Meanwhile, in the period 1980-2000, labor
productivity grew on average 1.8% and real wages were virtually stagnant. Thus, in this way, the WS
tended to decrease in developed countries.
In addition, the WS is calculated in an adjusted or unadjusted manner. The main dierence between
the two methods is that the Adjusted Wage Share (AWS) included the weight of self-employment.
7In 2007 the top 1% in the United States of America, held 23.5% of total income (the highest level since the Great
Depression).
8Dened as the proportion of workers whose hourly wages were less than two-thirds of the median wage across all
jobs.
9About 4,7% and 5,5% respectively.
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However, as in most developed countries the weight of self-employment is residual, there are not many
dierences in the trend of the two indicators (ILO, 2010; Guerriero, 2012).
AWS = Compensation.EmployeesGDP.factor.costs ×
TotalEmployment
TotalEmployees (4)
This way of calculating WS has the problem of assuming that the compensation of employees is
the same for employment and self-employment.
Figure 2: AWS in Portugal (1960-2016)
Source = AMECO
In Portugal, the evolution of the AWS was, in general, similar to that of other developed countries.
The evolution of AWS since 1960 until 1976 has been positive due to two main factors (Mamede et al.,
2013):
 the rapid industrialization that followed Portugal's entry into European Free Trade Association;
 the colonial war (1961-1974)10.
During the revolutionary period (1974-1976), wages grew at a higher rate than labor productivity,
as a result of social pressure to improve living conditions11, and this caused a positive evolution in
AWS, which has reached its maximum of the series in 1975. From 1976 to 1988, the AWS trend
was negative, and this was the result of international economic crises and the measures of the two
adjustment programs carried out by the IMF (Mamede et al. 2013). In these periods, the wage
increase was lower than the growth of productivity. On the contrary from 1988 to 1993, the evolution
of the AWS was positive due to economic growth. From the mid-1990s until the international crisis of
2008, AWS was relatively stable , and only began to decline in 2010. Since 2010, it has resumed this
negative trend and reached its lowest value in 2016.
For the reduction in the AWS, the rise in unemployment was relevant. Another factor that explains
the evolution of this indicator was the austerity measures that led to a reduction of wages.
Despite the reduction in AWS, some economists point out that one of the reasons for the stagnation
of the Portuguese economy since the year 2000, was the wage growth above compared to the growth of
10Mass emigration along with the mobilization for war has led to a shortage of labor, leading to higher wages.
11Was with the 25 of April that was instituted the minimum salary, unemployment subsidy and a social status of
European level.
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productivity ( Blanchard, 2006). Nevertheless, from 1960 to 2015, wage growth was much lower than
the growth in labor productivity- see gure 11 in appendix. According to the Gabinete de Estudos
Económicos  Ministério Economia e Inovação of Portugal (Pordata, 2018), the average salary for
employees in the private sector in Portugal in 2015 was around 913.9 ¿. If wages and productivity
had grown at the same level between 1960 and 2015, the average salary would be around 1271.43¿ in
2015.
After 2010, because of economic crisis, the gap between the evolution of labour productivity and
real wages increased.
3.2 Interpersonal Distribution of income
In the previous chapter, we analysed the declining in WS after mid-1970s. In Portugal, due to the
existence of exogenous shocks, we found that the reduction in WS was higher.
According to Krueger (1999), the WS is a wrong way of measuring the labor factor input on a
country's level of income, because includes wages of individuals with high income.
So, if we exclude the weight of top incomes, the reduction of the WS was even stronger (OECD,
2012).
For this reason, it makes sense to also analyze the interpersonal distribution of income in Portugal
over the last decades.
In developed countries, the level of dispersion of incomes has increased sharply, to highlight the
increase in the weight of top incomes (Piketty & Saez, 2003; Forster & Llenanozal , 2011; Atkinson et
al., 2011).
According to Piketty in his controversial book, Capital of the 21st Century (Pikkety, 2014), the
countries with the largest PS are also those where interpersonal inequalities are most pronounced.
Evolution of Main Indicators
To analyze the interpersonal income inequality I will address the evolution of the GINI coecient,
S80/S20, S90/S10 , and top incomes in Portugal.
The GINI coecient is a synthetic indicator of inequality and assumes values between 0, in a
situation in which all individuals have the same income and 100, in which an individual has all the
income in a given country.
The S80/S20 indicator indicates the proportion of the total monetary income received by the 20%
of the population's higher incomes in relation to the total received by the poorest 20%. The same can
be assumed for other analysis quantiles (Eg-S90/S10). Meanwhile, the P90/P10 indicator gives the
ratio between the income earned by the pair of individuals in the 10th and 90th percentiles. It will be
in analysis other forms (eg P95/P5).
For the indicators for which data is available for the whole economy, I will use the data processed
by Eurostat and the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), starting the series in 1993. I will also
address, when necessary, data Quadros de Pessoal (QP) - worked by Rodrigues et al (2012). This data
covers the period between 1985 and 2009, and the focus of study is the salaries of employees in the
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private sector.
The reason for collecting these dierent indicators is to be able to study various types of income
asymmetries. Thus, the gini index, for example, is particularly sensitive to the variation of yields in the
central part of the distribution. Other indicators, such as the S80 / S20, are sensitive to the variation
in the extreme yields of the distribution, with no impact on what happens in the central part of the
distribution.
Regarding the data from Eurostat/INE, the Gini index in 1993 reached 38.7, and from then on it
has veried a general improvement up to the year 2000. Despite a deterioration of this indicator from
2000 to 2004, the trend from 2005 onwards continues to be a reduction of inequalities in Portugal. In
fact, the index reached, in 2009 the minimum of the series with 33.7. From the beginning of the most
severe economic crisis in Portugal, the GINI index no longer has its downward trend and stabilizes
around 34. Despite the stabilization of the GINI index, the inequality of market income deteriorated
in the period in question (Rodrigues et al., 2016) 12.
In the data from QP, there was a large increase in the Gini index, from 28.4 in 1985 to 34.4 in
2009. There was only a decrease in inequality between 1996 and 1999 and in the period after 2005 -
see gure 12 in appendix.
Figure 3: Gini index per equivalent adult in Portugal
source : INE until 2000 after Eurostat
For S80/S20 and S90/S10, for INE/EUROSTAT data in Portugal, these indicators improved. Thus,
indicators S90/S10 and S80/S20 had their maximum value in 1993, with 16.9 and 8.2, respectively.
Subsequently, these indicators of inequality improved, until 2000. In spite of a small increase in
inequality in Portugal in the years 2000 and 2003, from 2004 onwards, these indicators started to
decline again and reached the minimum limits of the series in 2009, with S80/S20 reaching 5.6 and
S90/S10 to reach 9.2. Thus, from 1993 to 2009, the income gap between the poorest 20% and the
richest 20% had a large reduction (the same situation occurred in the income gap between the poorest
10% and the richest 10%).
12There was not a major worsening of this indicator, because the state redistribution more than counterbalanced the
eect of the greater inequality of market incomes.
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Figure 4: Income inequality per adult equivalent in Portugal - S80 / S20 and S90 / S10
source : INE until 2000 after Eurostat
From 2009 to 2014, when the crisis worsened, there was a reversal of the improvement in indicators
of inequality, with the increase of S80/S20 and S90/S10.
In the case of QP data, for indicators S80/S20 and S90/S10, inequality in Portugal followed a
growth trend from 1985 to 2009 (despite some years with improvements of little relevance) - see gure
13 in appendix.
Thus, in the years of the crisis, income inequality at the center of distribution remained stable, but
there was an increase in inequality at the extremes of income distribution. According to Rodrigues,
this increase in extreme inequalities is due to the lower income of the poorest individuals13 .
Despite the improvement in the indicators of inequality since the 1990s, Portugal is still one of the
European countries with the highest level of income inequality, only being better positioned than the
generality Eastern European countries (Farinha et al, 2012).
Regarding the top incomes, Alvaredo did an exhaustive research based on data from the tax admin-
istration (Alvaredo, 2009), and analyzed the evolution of higher incomes from a historical perspective
(1936 to 2005). Some of the indicators have only been available since 1976, while most of them have
been available since 1936.
In the same period, Guilera (2008) also analyzed the concentration of income and wealth in Por-
tugal, using data from the tax authorities14.
Although the data does not have as much variability, the conclusions of the studies are similar. The
weight of top income in Portugal was very high during the dictatorship regime. From the 1960s until
the early 1980s, there was a decrease in the weight of these incomes. After 1980, the weight of the top
yield increased until 2005, however, the TOP 0.1% and TOP 0.01% continue to present a much lower
weight than happened until the 1960s.
The upward trend of top income has taken place globally (Forster & Llenanozal, 2011), but Portugal
was in 2005, one of the OECD countries with the highest share of these incomes - see gure 14 in the
13Between 2009-2014 the real performance of the equivalent real income of the 1st decile was -25%, while in the 10th
decile this variation was -13%. In the period between 2006 and 2009, the real evolution had been 11% in the 1st decile
and -6% in the 10th decile.
14The dierences between the two estimates concern the dierent treatment of the original data, the dierent method
for adding social contributions to taxable income and dierent understandings for income.
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appendix. According to data from Cantante (2013), in 2005 the average gross annual income of an
agent that belongs to the richest 1% in Portugal was 142.703 ¿, while in the case of the richest 0.1%
it was 361.763 ¿. Lately, in the case of the richest 0.01% it was 1.012.527 ¿.
Figure 5: Top income in Portugal - 1%
source : data Guilera
Figure 6: Top income in Portugal - 0.1% and 0.01%
source : data Guilera & Alvaredo
Following the OECD (2012) idea, I will analyze the evolution of WS in Portugal, excluding the
weight of top income.
As can be seen in the following graph, excluding the top yields, the decrease in WS was even more.
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Figure 7: AWS excluding top yields
source = Data Guilera; AMECO; Data developed by my own.
The main conclusions of this chapter are that although the functional distribution of income has
become more unequal, especially in the periods after 1976 and 2010,15. There has been an improvement
in the generality of indicators of interpersonal inequality, both at the center and at the extremes of
the distribution. In the period after the crisis of 2008, there was a deterioration of the indicators
of inequality. Guilera (2008) and Alvaredo (2009) concluded that there has been an increase in the
importance of top income in Portugal since 1980.
If we analyse the data from QP, we will see that the importance of the weight of top yields actually
increased (especially in the TROIKA period) - see gure 15 in appendix.
3.3 Determinants of Functional and Personal Distribution of Income
As previously mentioned, both in Portugal and in most western countries, the distribution of func-
tional and interpersonal income has become more unequal since the mid-1970s. Thus, it is important
to study the main explanatory factors for the evolution of these indicators. It makes no sense to
separate the determining factors, because the causes are in part the same.
According to E. Stockhammer (2013), there are 4 main reasons for the negative evolution of the
WS in most western countries:
1. technological evolution (measured by the working capital ratio and the weight of ICT services);
2. globalization (measured by the openness of the economy);
3. nancialization (measured by external assets plus external liabilities in percentage of GDP);
4. reduction of the welfare state (measured by the public expenditure as % of GDP and conditioned
by the unionization rate).
Technological development inuences the functional distribution of income, because the ICT revolution
has led to low-skilled workers being replaced by machines, and more skilled workers complement those
machines. Thus the demand for more skilled workers increases, and the opposite happens for the less
15Even stronger if we exclude WS from top income.
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qualied workers. These two joint eects contribute to the increase in wage dispersion (due to the
increase in premium skill). The increase in the dispersion of wages, lead to the decrease of the WS,
because the increase in the weight of the most skilled workers is not enough to compensate the decrease
in the weight of the less skilled workers.
According to Palley (2013b), globalization is the set of policies that lead to free trade, increased
mobility of capital and business on a global scale. It is understood as the type of economic policy advo-
cated with the Washington consensus.With globalization, national workers feel increased competition
at international level. This factor culminates in the diminuition of their bargaining power. According
to Rodrik (1997), as capital is the most mobile factor, it benets from the liberalization that occurs.
The bargaining power of trade unions has also been reduced by globalization. According to the
ILO (2010), workers feel the threat of factory outsorcing to countries with lower labor costs.
According to Onaran et al. (2011), nancialization is understood as the deregulation of the nancial
sector, the proliferation of new nancial instruments, the increase of private debt and a great increase
in the income of workers' agents in the nancial sector.
As prot maximization in the short term is vital, rms should limit spending to the minimum,
particulary labour costs (Stockhammer, 2010).
According to Palley (2013b), nance has been marked by the transfer of income from labor to
capital, the change in the composition of payments to the capital factor and the increase in the weight
of the nancial sector in the totality of prots generated.
According to the authors, the decrease in the welfare state is considered an explanatory factor for
the decrease in WS because it contributes to the reduction of workers' bargaining power16. According
to Dünhaupt (2013), the privatization of state-owned enterprises also contributed to the reduction
of the AWS, because on average the prot of these companies is lower than in the case of private
companies.
There is no consensus among economists on which was the most responsible factor for the reduction
of the weight of wages in income. For Stockhammer (2013), in the case of developed countries, the
nancialization of the economy was the most inuential factor in the evolution of the WS. Meanwhile,
the IMF (2007) and the EC (2007) indicate that it has been aected by technological developments,
and globalization has also been relevant.
There are explanatory studies on the functional distribution of income in Portugal (Barradas &
Lagoa, 2015). These economists give special emphasis to the role of nancialization in WS, and
additionally analyze other factors, such as globalization, technology, education and business cycle.
According to the authors, nancialization inuences the functional distribution of income in three
ways:
1. it leads to a change in the sectoral prole of the economy (increase in the weight of the nancial
sector and decrease in the weight of the public sector);
2. it facilitated the emergence of shareholder value orientarion theory17;
3. it contributes to the weakening of trade unions- see gure 16 in appendix.
16For the IMF & EC (2007), the factors that inuence workers' bargaining power are the unionization rate, labor
market legislation, tax wedge, and generosity of the unemployment benet.
17Further explanation in Stockhammer (2005).
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The main conclusions of this study, in the short term, are that, the increase in nancialization of the
Portuguese Economy led to a decrease in WS. On the contrary, the increase of the weight of the state
in the economy, and the increase of the unionization had a positive eect in WS.
In the case of interpersonal income distribution, the determining factors are similar. In order to
analyze the determinants of the evolution of the weight of the top 1%, top 10% -1%, and the rest of
the population, Jester Roine et al. (2009) used a panel of data. They dene that the share of dierent
levels of income can vary due to changes in economic growth, level of nancial development, degree of
openness of the economy, level of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP and level of taxation.
In the phases of economic expansion, there is an increase in the relative weight of the TOP 1%.
This is because prots are, as a rule, pro-cyclical, ie, they increase more than the GDP growth. The
level of nancial development, translated by the relative weight of the banking sector and the stock
market, also has a positive impact on the weight of higher incomes. (the occurrence of bank crises
eventually leads to losses in these agents). Public expenditure in percentage of GDP has no impact on
the weight of the top 1% and inuences positively, the evolution of the lower incomes. The increase in
taxation, as measured by the increase in maximum marginal tax rates, contributes to the reduction of
the top 1% and top 1% -10%.
According to Piketty & Saez (2011), the high increase in marginal maximum tax rates was one of
the most important factors to the reduction of income after World War II in developed countries (in
Portugal it was similar).
For Jester Roine et al. (2009), openness to trade has no impact on income inequalities. There are
also other explanatory factors for income inequality. For the IMF (Dabla-Norris et al, 2015 ; Jaumotte
et al, 2013) technological developments, changes in institutions in the labor market, globalization and
nancialization were also important. Labor market reforms have contributed to wage stagnation and
increasing wage inequalities, as they lead to a reduction in the rate of unionization, labor market
solidarity18, and stagnation of the minimum wage.
4 Demand eects due to the variation of the WS
For the most popular models of the comtemporany macroeconomics, the distribution of income has no
eect on economic growth, and markets are considered to be perfectly competitive. It is argued that
the return of labor and capital must be equal to its marginal productivity.
As the long-run growth rate of an economy is inuenced by capital accumulation, a country, in
order to have high rates of GDP growth, needs to spend signicant resources channeled to savings.
Moreover, for traditional models, the level of AD is not important, and in the long run, scal and
monetary policies are not able to inuence the product. For that type of models, policies favoring
technical progress and structural reforms designed to make prices and wages more exible, will cause
an increase the potential growth of the economy and increase job creation.
For this reason, according to Lavoie & Stockhammer (2013), governments have adopted economic
policies, which are dened as pro-capital. These policies are intended to make the labor market more
exible, and some examples may be:
18When the labor market reform occurred in Portugal during the TROIKA period, the minimum wage was frozen, the
retirement age increased and it was dicult the access to social benets, such as unemployment benet (ILO, 2013).
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 decreasing the minimum wage;
 weakening labor legislation, collective bargaining, and union power.
Other examples are the reduction of taxes on companies and limiting the taxes on capital gains in the
stock market.
For neoclassical economists, wages only constitute a cost to rms. The increase in real wages,
in addition to having negative eects on economic growth, leads to increasing unemployment. The
reasons pointed out are the existence of increasing marginal costs and the companies' need to maximize
prots.
Institutions such as the IMF or the EC have prescribed wage moderation as a means of increasing
the potential for economic growth in most countries19. As previously mentioned, wage moderation,
contributing to wage increases below productivity growth, leads to a decrease in WS.
Although there was a cumulative decrease of 10 percentage points in the WS between 1970s and
the pre-crisis period in the OECD countries, the implementation of these economic policies did not
lead to higher rates of economic growth - see table 11 in appendix.
By contrast, the PK do not agree that wage moderation stimulates the growth of economies because
they argue that wages are a source of additional demand for the economy and that marginal costs of
rms are constant, which leads to a decrease in average costs until the level of total productive capacity
(Lavoie, 2009). This assumption, which is visible in most economies, 20 will imply that rms have
no supply constraints, ie they can increase production to cope with sudden surges in demand. The
main limiting factor for the investment is the lack of AD, and this does not depend on saving's level.
For this reason, investment decisions will inuence economic growth and the functional distribution of
income.
The PK consider that the exibilization of prices and salaries are harmful to an economy. The
argument is that, in a situation of recession, the decrease in prices and wages causes a decrease in
purchasing power of economic agents, motivated by the increase of the amount of debt in real terms.
For Kalecki (1939), the level of market power of companies is a determining factor of the functional
distribution of income. These companies could set a mark-up well above the variable average costs,
which made it possible to cover production costs and thus have abnormal prots.
According to PK economists, the marginal propensity to consume through wages is higher than
the marginal propensity to consume through prots21.
Goodwin (Feinstein & Dobb,1967) developed a model that related the Phillips curve to the Kaleck-
ian theory of classes. According to the assumptions of this model, an increase in employment con-
tributes to higher wage growth, which would lead to an increase in WS. Thus, the reduction of business
investment will occur in the future and that will culminate in the reduction of the GDP. This model
works as a cycle, because in this situation, the reduction of the product will lead to the reduction of
employment, which will cause the reduction of the WS.
19According to EC (2012), the structural reforms prescript in TROIKA package would contribute to reducing unem-
ployment, regaining global competitiveness and strengthening economic growth, namely the growth of potential output.
20See Figure 17 in the appendix.
21In the initial Kaleckian models it was assumed that the marginal propensity to consume through wages was 1 and
the marginal propensity to consume through prots ranged from 0 to 1.
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Likewise, according to Rezai & Carvalho (2015), an increase in the inequality of labor income would
contribute to an increase in the marginal propensity of saving by the workers. Thus the transfer of
income from the capital factor to labor factor, or from a rich individual to a poor individual, would
contribute to an increase in AD22. Through these assumptions, the PK dened two regimes: wage-led
regime, when the increase of WS contributes to an acceleration of economic growth, and prot-led
regime (also known as stagnationists), when the increase of WS contributes to the deceleration of
economic growth (Lavoie & Stockhammer, 2012). Thus the adoption of pro-capital policies will favor
the economic growth of a country in the prot-led regime, but will hurt economic growth in a wage-led
regime. By contrast, the adoption of pro-labor policies will favor economic growth in a wage-led regime,
but penalize economic growth in a prot-led regime. The adoption of economic policies contrary to
the current economic regime will cause economic instability.
Regarding the impact of WS variation on private investment, there are opposite eects. The
increase in WS will provide the increase in AD (due to the higher marginal propensity to consume),
which has a positive impact on the level of utilization of productive capacity, that leads to the increase
in private investment23.
However, it also contributes to the increase of the production costs of the companies. By decreasing
the PS expected for a given level of productive capacity used at a normal level (protability eect),
there is a stimulus for reducing private investment.
In situations where the accelerating eect is greater than the protability eect, private investment
will not decrease and economic growth accelerates, not only in the immediate but also in the long
term, as a result of the acceleration of the rate of capital growth. Thus, the economy lies in a wage led
regime, in relation to demand and in relation to investment. By contrast, when the protability eect
is more intense than the accelerating eect, the economy is in a wage led regime in relation to demand,
but it is prot led in relation to investment. Thus, long-term growth will slow down because of lower
capital accumulation. Finally, when an increase in the WS leads to a decline in private investment
that is stronger than the increase in private consumption, economic growth will slow not only in the
long run but also at the in the short run.
It is more likely that an economy is on a wage-led regime in the following situations:
1. There is a huge dierence between the marginal propensity to consume through wages and prots;
2. Investment is heavily inuenced by demand variation and is not sensitive to declining protability.
Until now, we have considered a closed economy. With the increase in foreign trade, NX were incor-
porated into the original model (Bhaduri & Marglin, 1990).
We nd that an economy can nd itself in dierent regimes, depending whether we are to analyze
the economy as closed, or considering the existing trade with the outside. This happens because the
increase in WS can lead to the following situations:
22These mechanisms are self-reinforcing because wage earners have, on average, a lower level of income than capital
holders.
23According to the accelerator mechanism, in order to increase private investment is necessary an acceleration of
economic growth.
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1. a reduction in the margin of companies, which means that some exporters will no longer be
economically viable;
2. an increase in the export price, which means that some exported products will no longer be
competitive.
When the increase in WS causes an acceleration of economic growth with a closed economy but slowing
economic growth with an open economy, the country is in a wage led domestic demand regime and in
a prot led total demand regime.
It is more likely that a country will nd itself in a wage led scheme when:
1. the degree of openness of the economy is reduced;
2. the elasticity of exports and imports is low.
Despite the analysis of this Kaleckian model, focusing on the eects under AD, the WS variation can
also inuence supply and productivity evolution. However, this eect will not be analyzed24.
Some economies in a wage led regime may show high levels of economic growth, despite the use
of pro-capital economic measures. However, there must be external mechanisms such as debt-based
growth or increased exports. In the rst case, there is a need for a continuous increase in the level of
indebtedness of economic agents. In the second case, the accumulation of lasting and growing external
surpluses is necessary. It is not possible for all countries to present external surpluses at the same
time.
If countries seek to pursue policies of price/wage reductions, they will not be able to increase their
external market shares and will only contribute to the stagnation of the AD (Beggar thy neighbour
policy).
Oliveira (2013), estimated that for Portugal, an increase in 1 p.p in the WS would lead to a
deterioration of NX by 0.295%. For this reason, for an individual country, the use of this strategy is
limited.
5 Econometric Analysis
Most of the studies that analyze the impact of variations of the WS on economic activity are based
on the work of Bhaduri & Marglin (1990). These papers about wage-led growth develop econometric
models constructed in single equation. Although it is a simpler methodology to use and the analysis
24According to Naastepad & Storm (2013), the increase in wages increases the incentive of companies to invest in
more capital-intensive production techniques, to save labor use (productivity eect), and secondly, Kaldor -Verdoon
eect (product enhancement has positive eects on better division of labor and increased learning-by-doing - economies
of scale).
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of the results of the model is more noticeable, it does not allow a complete analysis because it does
not allow the interaction between the macroeconomic variables in a dynamic way.
According to the OECD (2012), despite the reduction of the WS since the 1970s, the weight of top
income has increased signicantly in most countries in the same period25. Thus, it is legitimate to
say that the reduction of a standard worker's WS has been even more intense than discussed at this
point.
To capture this eect, beside using the functional distribution of income and following the studies
of Rezai & Carvalho (2015) and Palley (2014), I will also include indicators related to the interpersonal
distribution of incomes, namely, the weight of top incomes.
To study the impact of variations in income distribution on economic growth in dierent phases of
the economic cycle (Feinstein & Dobb, 1967), it will be included a variable that relates the deviations
between eective and potential product.
Following the example of Lavoie & Stockhammer (2012), it will also included a variable related to
the external competitiveness of the economy. The chosen variable will be the terms of trade of the
economy. Marin (1992) proved that the terms of trade inuence the productivity and GDP growth.
For Vieira & Holland (2006), the structure of specialization of the imports and exports of a country
have impact on the terms of trade of a country .
According to Blecker (2016), AD tends to be more prot led in the short term, and more wage
led in the long term, because the positive eects of a higher level of prots on private investment and
NX (due to lower wage costs) are stronger in the short run, and the eect of a larger share of private
consumption is more intense in the long run.
In this model, it will be studied the interaction between the variables from a long-term perspective.
5.1 Data Description
The data consists of annual time series covering the period between 1985 and 2016. The variables
included in the model are as follows: Gross Domestic Product (GDP ), Prot Share at factor costs (π),
0,01% Income Share (TOP001%), Terms of Trade (Ttrade) and gap between eective and potential
unemployment (GAP ).
To construct the GDP variable, it is necessary to purge the consumer price index (CPI) to nominal
gross domestic product. These two variables are available in the Annual Macro-Economic Database of
the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Aairs (AMECO).
To construct the variable π it was necessary to calculate the weight of income share (AWS at factor
costs). π will be the dierence between the total income and the AWS. This variable was also taken
from the AMECO database.
The variable Ttrade translates the relationship between the ratio of the export and import prices.
All these variables are available in the AMECO database.
Lastly, to construct the GAP variable, it is necessary to withdraw the variables eective unemploy-
ment and non acceleration rate of unemployment (NAIRU) from the AMECO database and calculate
the dierence between the two variables.
25For Saez & Veall (2005) the explanation was the large increase in the salaries of top managers.
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All variables except GAP are in logarithms.
So far, when the evolution of top income in Portugal has been analyzed, I used the data from
Alvaredo (2009) and Guilera (2008). However, because we have the interest of analyzing the evolution
of top income in the period after the 2007 Financial Crisis26, I decided not to use the previous series.
Another reason for not using the previous data was due to data breaks between 1981 and 1989. As
in this case the number of observations would be very small, it would not be possible to insert a large
set of explanatory variables in the model.
Thus, the variable TOP0,01% was taken from the micro data of QP. This database includes infor-
mation on employees (I only used full-time employees with full compensation). The variable selected
to study these indicators of wage inequality was the monthly gain 27.
The biggest disadvantage of using this data is that it does not include civil servants nor the self-
employed.
The objective of this work is to analyze not only the impact of variations in the functional distri-
bution, but also variations in the weight of the various top yields in the long term economic growth.
I constructed 3 econometric regressions.
5.2 Metodological Approach
In order to decide the methodology to be used, it is necessary to determine the order of integration
of the variables of the model. For this reason, it is necessary to use the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller
(Dickey & Fuller, 1979) test. If there are variables of order two, they must be excluded from the
model.
According to the following table, we conclude that the variables of the model do not have the same
integration level, ie, there are I(0) and I(1) variables. To overcome this restriction, I consider that the
methodology that should be used is Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL).
Table 1: Unit Root Test - ADF Test
Levels 1stdifferences
Conclusion
Intercept Intercept and Trend None Intercept Intercept and Trend None
π -0.371 -1.160 0.955 -3.367 ** -5.386*** -5.138*** I(1)
GDP -2.788* -1.536 1.142 - - - I(0)
TOP001% -0.068 -3.611 ** 2.082 - - - I(0)
GAP -1.912 0.186 -1.418 -5.299*** -5.284*** -5.427*** I(1)
Ttrade -4.394*** -5.355*** 2.073 - - - I(0)
*, ** and *** mean signicance 10%, 5% and 1% level. Number of lags chosen by Akaike Information
Criteria (AIC)
26Last year where data are available were 2006.
27This corresponds to the amount received by the workers in October of each year, gross of taxes and contributions
to Social Security.
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5.2.1 ARDL Approach
Although the ARDL methodology has been used in econometrics for decades, the use of this method
became more frequent, after demonstrating the importance of testing long-term economic relationships
when the time series are cointegrated (Pesaran & Shin, 1998).
It is said that the variables are cointegrated if the two series are not stationary, but the linear
combination of the series becomes stationary.
In a situation where the two series are not stationary but their linear combination is still non-
stationary, the relationship is said to be spurious. Although the regression has a very high R2, the
value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is very low, and the regressions are no longer statistically valid.
Thus, the ARDL is a regressive model, in which the dependent variable, Yt can be explained by its
own lags, and in which it can also be explained by the explanatory variables, both contemporaneously
and by their past eects.
The ARDL model has the following general form:








βcxm,c−i + ϵt (5)
where δ is a constant, yt is a dependent variable, xt is a vector of independent variables and εt is
a white noise error term.
ARDLs is usually dened with the following notation: ARDL(p, q1, qk), where p is the number of
lags of the dependent variable, q1 is the number of lags of the rst explanatory variable, qk and is the
number of lags of the k-th explanatory variable.
Next, we will proceed to choose the optimal ARDL model.
As previously mentioned, the following regressions will be constructed:




































5.2.2 ARDL Order Selection Model
Next we will decide the number of optimal lags that our model should present.
To choose the optimal length model, we used the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (Akaike,1974).
With this test, we are comparing the dierent possible models from the relative point of view, and
the model to be chosen is the one with the lowest criterion value.
The AIC attaches importance to goodness of t, but also includes disincentives for the model not to
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have too many estimated parameters. This, since it increases the number of parameters of the model,
will necessarily imply an increase of the goodness of the t.
In addition, it can be use one of the criteria : the information criterion (BIC) or information
criterion of HannanQuinn (HQC).
Although, according to Burnham et al. (2004) and Yang (2005), the use of the rst criterion of
information is more correct. This happens because the AIC is asymptotically optimum when selecting
the least residual model, with the assumption that "true model" is never chosen.
The following gures summarize the values resulting from the AIC criteria to the top 20 models of
the selection:
Figure 8: Model 1 selection
Thus, the ARDL model chosen through the AIC criterion is as follows:
GDPt = δ0 + ϕ1GDPt−1 + ϕ2GDPt−2 + β1πt+
γ1TOP001%t + γ2TOP001%t−1 + γ3TOP001%t−2 + εt (9)
where δ0 represents the constant and εt represents the white noise error term.
For regressions 2 and 3, the models chosen through the AIC28 criteria are as follows:
GDPt = δ0 + ϕ1GDPt−1 + ϕ2GDPt−2 + ϕ3GDPt−3 + ϕ4GDPt−4 + β1πt+
β2πt−1 + β3πt−2 + β4πt−3 + β4πt−4 + γ1TOP001%t + θ1GAPt + θ2GAPt−1 + εt (10)
28Top graph of 20 models according to the AIC criteria are available in the appendix.
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GDPt = δ0 + ϕ1GDPt−1 + ϕ2GDPt−2 + β1πt + β2πt−1 + β3πt−2 + β4πt−3+
γ1TOP001%t + γ2TOP001%t−1 + γ3TOP001%t−2 + α1Ttradet + α2Ttradet−1 + εt (11)
5.2.3 Hypotheses to be tested
After choosing the optimal lag length, it is necessary to perform a set of statistical tests to analyze
if it can be used.
Firstly, it is necessary to analyze if the model presents autocorrelation in the residues. If this does
not happen, the estimator is no longer ecient, that is, its variance is no longer minimal. If the null
hypothesis is the absence of autocorrelation, applying the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Serial Correlation
LM Test, we prove that there is no evidence of serial correlation.
The summary of test results can be found in the table below:
Table 2: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
It is also necessary to determine if the variance of the estimated errors is constant, ie, if the model
has heteroscedasticity. Therefore, it is necessary to test again by applying the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey.
The null hypothesis assumes that the residues are homoscedastic. Thus, according to the following
table, we cannot reject that the model is homoscedastic.
Table 3: Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
Next we will study if the model is well specied. That is, if the model is in an incorrect functional
form, or lastly, if the number of lags in the model is not correct. To study the functional specication
of the model we will use the RESET test. According to the value of F-Statistic, we cannot reject in any
of the series, the null hypothesis, which indicates that the various regressions are not badly specied.
Table 4: RESET Test
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Next, we will analyze whether the regression residuals follow a normal distribution. According to
Jarque & Bera (1980), if the residuals are "well distributed" the distribution will be normal. As in
this case, the Jarque-Bera test statistic has a reduced value, we do not reject the null hypothesis of
well-distributed residues.





χ2- statistics are reported ρ - value between parenthesis
Finally, it is necessary to analyze, if the model is stable. Thus, the most important tests to analyze
stability are the CUSUM and the CUSUMSQ test based on the cumulative sum of the recursive
residuals and on the cumulative sum of squares of the recursive residuals (Brown et al., 1975). If the
model is not stable there will be structural breaks, that is, an unexpected shift in the time series,
which can lead to predictive errors and model unreliability.
CUSUM is most commonly used to track changes to detect recurring changes in regression coe-
cients. On the other hand, the CUSUMSQ, is used to ascertain a situation where the departure of the
constancy of the regression coecients is casual and sudden.
When a model is stable, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ will be approximately zero. This option presents
a critical line of 5%. If the test statistic is outside the area between the critical lines the model will
suer from instability.
Figure 9: CUSUM Test
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Figure 10: CUSUMQ Test
As can be seen, CUSUM and CUSUMSQ remain within the boundary throughout the time series
period, which means that the model is stable.
After the model has passed the tests required for its use, it is now possible to analyze the long-term
relationship between the variables, through the bounds test approach to cointegration29.
5.2.4 Bounds Tests
According to Pesaran & Smith (2001), to apply the Bounds test to the cointegration, it is necessary
to calculate the model to the dierences (GDPt−GDPt−1) and to introduce on the right side of the
expression, the various coecients of the explanatory variables of the model, in order to estimate a
conditional error correction mechanism (ECM).
To analyze if there is no long-term relationship between the variables, it is necessary to perform an
F-Test, estimating the null hypothesis,H0:ϕ1=ϕ2 =ϕ3 =0. If we reject the null hypothesis, it means
that the long-term coecient of the variables is dierent from 0, and there is a relationship between
them.
△GDP = δ0 + ϕ1GDPt−1 + ϕ2πt−1 + ϕ3TOP001%t−1+
α1△GDPt−1 + ω1△TOP001%t + ω2△TOP001%t−1 + εt (12)
When conducting a joint signicance test of the previous regression there may be several problems.
The distribution will be dierent depending on whether the regression is I (0) or I (1). However, to
address this situation, Pesaran & Smith (2001) provide bounds on the critical values for the asymptotic
distribution of the F-statistic.
Thus, a lower and upper limit is set for the value of the critical values. If the F-statistic exceeds
the lower limit, it means that all explanatory variables of the model are stationary, ie I (0), and
29All statistical tests were performed for the remaining regressions and are found in the appendix.
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cointegration cannot be used. If the F statistic exceeds the upper limit, it means instead that all the
explanatory variables of the model are I (1), and cointegration can be used.
The lower bound is based on the hypothesis that all the variables are I(0), and the upper bound
means that all of the variables are I(1). Lastly, if the statistical test is between the two intervals, the
test is not conclusive.
Table 6: Bounds Test
When analyzing the value of the test statistic, we did not reject the null hypothesis of non-
cointegration at 1%. Thus, we can estimate the model that illustrates the long-term relationships
between variables.
5.2.5 Long Run Model
The long-term model can be derived from the conditional ECM. The following is presented in the
static form:
GDPt = Ω0 +Ω1πt +Ω2TOP001%t + εt (13)
where Ωn is the long-run coecient of the model variables.
The table represents the coecient and level of signicance of the variables of the three regressions:
Table 7: Long-Run Coecients - Regression 1
Variables Coecient P-Value
Ω1 π -0.469758** 0.0362
Ω2 TOP001% 0.285974*** 0.0000
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Table 8: Long-Run Coecients - Regression 2
Variables Coecient P-Value
Ω1 π -0.430000*** 0.0011
Ω2 TOP001% 0.24314*** 0.0000
Ω3 GAP -0.028459** 0.0399
Table 9: Long-Run Coecients - Regression 3
Variables Coecient P-Value
Ω1 π -0.458778* 0.0737
Ω2 TOP001% -0.061989 0.7138
Ω3 Ttrade 2.661807** 0.0362
5.3 Discussion of Results
In the long term, except for variable TOP001% 30, all variables are statistically signicant. Con-
trary to the initial expectations, the results indicate that an increase in TOP001% contributes to an
acceleration of the GDP growth rate.
In the case of regression 1, a 1.p.p increase in TOP001% will contribute to the acceleration of
GDP growth of 0.29 p.p in the long run. One possible explanation for the positive eects of the rise
in top-level inequality is the possibility to dierentiate rewards and provide incentives for economic
agents to work longer hours, invest and innovate (Krueger, 2018).
The variable π shows the expected coecient signal. For the same regression, a 1.p.p increase in π
causes a long run deceleration of GDP growth of about 0.46 p.p.
The GAP variable has an expected impact, but the value of its coecient is very low. In the
regression 2, a 1.p.p increase in GAP causes a residual long run deceleration of GDP growth of about
-0.03 p.p. One possible explanation for the absence of economic impacts is the consideration of the
neutrality of the money in the long run, that is, discretionary policies have no long-term impact (Lucas,
1972).
Regarding the importance of foreign trade, the variable Ttrade shows the the expected coecient
signal. Thus, in the regression 3, the improvement of 1.p.p in the Ttrade contributes to the long run
acceleration of the GDP growth of about 2,66 p.p. The justication for this is that changes in terms
of trade inuence the rate of sustainable economic growth that mantains the balance of payments in
equilibrium (McCombie & Thirlwall, 1994).
30In regression 3.
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In short, the results indicate that the Portuguese economy is in a wage led regime in relation to
the functional distribution of income, but presents characteristics of prot led regime with respect to
the interpersonal distribution of income.
This results conrm the research developed by Palley (2013). The functional distribution of incomes
(according to factors of production) does not fully reect totally social power balances. In fact, many
income qualied as "work" are in fact "agency" (salaries of administrators, managers).
The transfer of income from the capitalists to blue collar workers causes the economy to accelerate.
Meanwhile, the transfer of income from white collar workers to blue collar workers, causes the slowdown
of the economy.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this work was to analyze the impact of the (functional and interpersonal) income
inequality for the Portuguese economy in the long term for the period between 1985-2016. At the
beginning of the study, we analyzed the evolution of the Portuguese economy on a long-term trend
since 1960, and it was concluded that there was a downward trend in GDP growth rate.
Regarding the functional distribution of income, the weight of prots in total income has tended
to increase since the late 1970s. Regarding the weight of top income, although it has not yet reached
the high levels of the 1960s, the trend has also been growing.
It was expected that, the decline in the WS in total income and the increase in interpersonal
inequality in Portugal, would cause the deceleration of GDP.
According to the PK theory, the reduction in WS, and at the same time, the increase of interpersonal
inequality, would contribute to a reduction of the AD, because the marginal propensity to consume
through wages is higher than the marginal propensity through interest, income or prots. Just as
the marginal propensity to consume by low-income agents is higher than the marginal propensity of
high-income individuals.
The results of the models indicate that the transfer of earnings from the labor factor to the capital
factor will have the eect of slowing the economic growth in the long run. Contrary to expectations,
the increase in the weight of top income in Portugal has not led to a slowdown in economic growth
from a long-term perspective. As expected, improved terms of trade have positive eects on economic
growth.
The performance of this study presented problems, since the number of observations regarding
data of interpersonal income inequality was insucient and with breaks.To solve this problem it was
necessary to work the data of the Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento - MTSS. However, as the
number of observations continued to be reduced (32), it was not possible to include more explanatory
variables or to analyze the impact of changes in functional and interpersonal income inequality in
dierent periods of the Portuguese economy (for the period before entering the EU, ie 1960-1985, and
the following period, 1986-2016).
Despite the problems with the data, this work has the merit of being one of the few studies on the
Portuguese economy, where income inequality is analyzed and related to economic growth, in a long
term perspective.
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As the reasons for the increase in the weight of PS are essentially the same as the increase in
top income, it can be concluded that governments should be focused on increasing WS, because the
positive eect of the increase in this indicator is stronger than the long-term reduction of GDP caused
by the decrease in top inequality (in regression 1 is 0.46 vs -0,28).
Given the high level of external debt in Portugal, the adoption of this economic policy strategy
is not easy for an individual country. Thus, in order to avoid external imbalances, there must be
cooperation among countries to raise WS.
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A Appendix
Table 10: Evolution of adjusted wage share (AWS) at GDP market prices in countries most aected
by the sovereign debt crisis
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ∆AWS
Ireland 52,9 49,7 47,9 47,3 47,9 46,3 36,9 37,5 -15,5pp
Greece 54,1 54,3 53,1 52,2 49,8 49,5 48,9 49,9 -4,2pp
Spain 58,7 57,7 57,1 55,6 55,1 55,1 54,9 54,5 -4,2pp
Italy 54,2 54,1 53,6 53,7 53,4 53,0 53,0 53,1 -1,1pp
Cyprus 55,8 54,6 54,5 54,3 51,9 50,6 50,5 51,1 -4,7pp
Portugal 57,6 56,5 55,5 54,0 53,7 52,7 51,3 51,4 -6,2pp
Source = AMECO
Figure 11: Evolution of real compensation and labour productivity in Portugal
Source = Ameco; Data developed by my own.
Figure 12: Gini index
Source = QP (1985-2009)
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Figure 13: S80/S20 and S90/S10
Source : QP (1985-2009)
Figure 14: Share of the average annual income of the richest 1% in OECD countries (2005)
Source:Alvaredo, F., Atkinson A., Piketty T. & Saez E., The World Top Incomes Database,
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
Figure 15: Top 1%, 0,1% an 0,01
Source : QP
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Figure 16: Union Rate Density
Source: OECD
Table 11: GDP growth rate in developped countries
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2012)
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Figure 17: Capacity Utilization Total Industry - United States of America
Source: FRED
Figure 18: Model 2 selection
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Figure 19: Model 3 selection
Table 12: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test - Regression 2
Table 13: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test - Regression 3
Table 14: Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey - Regression 2
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Table 15: Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey - Regression 3
Table 16: RESET Test - Regression 2
Table 17: RESET Test - Regression 3




χ2- statistics are reported ρ - value between parenthesis




χ2- statistics are reported ρ - value between parenthesis
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Figure 20: CUSUM Test - Model 2
Figure 21: CUSUM Test - Model 3
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Figure 22: CUSUMQ Test - Model 2
Figure 23: CUSUMQ Test - Model 3
36
João Alcobia Functional and Interpersonal Distribution of Income and Economic Growth in Portugal
Table 20: Bounds Test - Regression 2
Table 21: Bounds Test - Regression 3
Table 22: Data Sources
Mathematical Symbol Series name Source
GDP Gross Domestic Product AMECO
π Adjusted Prot Share AMECO
GAP Gap between eective and potential unemployment AMECO
TOP001% Top 0,01% income share Quadros de Pessoal
Ttrade Terms of Trade AMECO
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Table 23: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev. Observations
GDP 151,95 167,37 181,99 92,40 27,64 32
π 0,35 0,35 0,40 0,31 0,02 32
GAP 0,39 0,35 3,03 -1,20 1,04 32
TOP001% 0,29 0,32 0,51 0,13 0,11 30
Ttrade 95,87 97,97 105,92 73,19 6,61 32
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